Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams (Englisch)
- Neue Suche nach: de Oliveira, Henrique
- Neue Suche nach: de Oliveira, Henrique
In:
Games and economic behavior
;
109
;
126-131
;
2018
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ISSN:
- Aufsatz (Zeitschrift) / Print
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Titel:Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams
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Beteiligte:de Oliveira, Henrique ( Autor:in )
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Erschienen in:Games and economic behavior ; 109 ; 126-131
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Verlag:
- Neue Suche nach: Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam
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Erscheinungsdatum:01.01.2018
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Format / Umfang:6 pages
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ISSN:
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Medientyp:Aufsatz (Zeitschrift)
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Format:Print
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Sprache:Englisch
- Neue Suche nach: 519.305
- Weitere Informationen zu Dewey Decimal Classification
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Klassifikation:
DDC: 519.305 -
Datenquelle:
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