Extremal incentive compatible transfers (English)
- New search for: Kos, N.
- New search for: Messner, M.
- New search for: Kos, N.
- New search for: Messner, M.
In:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
;
148
, 1
;
134-164
;
2013
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ISSN:
- Article (Journal) / Print
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Title:Extremal incentive compatible transfers
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Contributors:Kos, N. ( author ) / Messner, M. ( author )
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Published in:JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY ; 148, 1 ; 134-164
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Publisher:
- New search for: Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam
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Publication date:2013-01-01
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Size:31 pages
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ISSN:
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Type of media:Article (Journal)
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Type of material:Print
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Language:English
- New search for: 330
- Further information on Dewey Decimal Classification
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Classification:
DDC: 330 -
Source:
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Table of contents – Volume 148, Issue 1
The tables of contents are generated automatically and are based on the data records of the individual contributions available in the index of the TIB portal. The display of the Tables of Contents may therefore be incomplete.
- 1
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AnnouncementHellwig, Christian / Shell, Karl et al. | 2013
- 2
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Deliberation, disclosure of information, and votingJackson, Matthew O. / Tan, Xu et al. | 2012
- 31
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Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contractsDonaldson, John B. / Gershun, Natalia / Giannoni, Marc P. et al. | 2012
- 64
-
Social networks and unraveling in labor marketsFainmesser, Itay P. et al. | 2012
- 104
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Mechanism design without revenue equivalenceCarbajal, Juan Carlos / Ely, Jeffrey C. et al. | 2012
- 134
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Extremal incentive compatible transfersKos, Nenad / Messner, Matthias et al. | 2012
- 165
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When are signals complements or substitutes?Börgers, Tilman / Hernando-Veciana, Angel / Krähmer, Daniel et al. | 2012
- 196
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Learning and risk aversionOyarzun, Carlos / Sarin, Rajiv et al. | 2012
- 226
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Hidden symmetries and focal pointsAlós-Ferrer, Carlos / Kuzmics, Christoph et al. | 2012
- 259
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A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere oneSato, Shin et al. | 2012
- 279
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Smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysisHayashi, Takashi et al. | 2012
- 306
-
Safety first consumptionSattinger, Michael et al. | 2012
- 322
-
Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externalityUeda, Kenichi et al. | 2012
- 353
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Inequality, mobility and redistributive politicsArawatari, Ryo / Ono, Tetsuo et al. | 2012
- 376
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A two-sided reputation result with long-run playersAtakan, Alp E. / Ekmekci, Mehmet et al. | 2012
- 393
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Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costsLu, Jingfeng / Ye, Lixin et al. | 2012
- 409
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Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationshipsSchumacher, Heiner et al. | 2012
- 418
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Comment on “On the co-existence of conventions” [J. Econ. Theory 107 (2002) 145–155]Shi, Fei et al. | 2012
- IFC
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Editorial Board| 2013