Please choose your delivery country and your customer group
It is believed that the overall safety of reactor operation will be improved upon completion of projects CG-558, 600, even at the higher power levels anticipated. Installation of sub-critical monitoring instruments concurrent with these projects is a factor in this conclusion. Higher power levels will not of themselves increase the probability of a disaster initiating event; however, higher power levels will reduce the time available for remedial action and will increase the severity of the consequences of a disaster. Loss of process cooling water will precede or accompany a reactor disaster. A reactor containing a normal inventory of fission products will surely be destroyed, with release of some fission products, if cooling water is lost at operational power levels or within hours after shutting down the reactor from operational levels. A power excursion along with the water loss, unless causing a puff release of fission product, will only hasten the destruction. A power excursion not caused by loss of cooling water is possible, but appears to be of almost negligibly small probability. Such an excursion will not become disastrous unless a significant fraction of the cooling water is boiled out of the reactor. The scope of projects CG-558 and CG-600, a discussion of reactor hazards, a technical summary of pertinent aspects of reactor control and reactor cooling, and a discussion of development programs designed to increase efficiency of operation and further decrease the hazards are included in Volume 1.