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At the conclusion of the six-nation talks in Beijing last August, North Korea announced there was no reason for further negotiations and their only option was to continue their nuclear weapons development program. The Beijing Summit was the first multilateral diplomatic effort aimed at heading off a nuclear crisis that became apparent in October 2002 when North Korea acknowledged restarting its nuclear program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In exchange for giving up the nuclear program, North Korea wants economic aid, diplomatic recognition, and security assurances from the US through a nonaggression treaty. The Bush administration regards these demands as 'blackmail' and is unwilling to negotiate unless North Korea first dismantles its nuclear program. Almost two months after the talks in Beijing, there continues to be a standoff between the US and North Korea that precludes meaningful negotiation. The stakes are high and now North Korea claims to have begun making bombs out of spent nuclear fuel rods. The Bush administration's hard line approach is understandable given the post-9/11 atmosphere of heightened apprehension and increased efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the hands of terrorists. As understandable as the approach may be, it is not working. A prolonged stalemate gives North Korea more time to develop its nuclear capability and increases the risk the weapons will be used. The gravity of the situation demands a thoughtful reassessment of the US strategy toward North Korea within the context of long range strategic goals for Asia. A successful strategy must consider the motivation for North Korea's behavior and plan the next steps in a way that is most likely to elicit responses that serve US interests. The following assessment considers the national interests of each party, weighs risks and options, and proposes a strategy of conditional engagement.