While the 2011 uprising deeply challenged the authoritarian regime in several regions, analysis of the parliamentary election in wartime is crucial to understanding how the regime attempted to renew its social base, which is assumed to have shrunk during the first years of the conflict. The last poll to elect the 250 MPs of the People's Council took place in April 2016 in a country deeply divided, at a time when regime forces were still weak and controlled less than 40% of the territory. Despite the profound upheavals caused by the conflict, the Syrian authorities organised the election in a manner similar to the pre-war process. The Regional Command of the Baath Party played a key role in the pre-selection of candidates despite having lost its role as the leading party in society and the state in the 2012 constitution. It oversaw the establishment of the National Unity lists, which included Baathist candidates, those of the other parties in the National Progressive Front and - in some electoral districts - independent candidates, all of whom were elected. As a result of this selection before the election day, the distribution of seats by political affiliation did not fundamentally change during the war and neither did the representation of different social groups - despite a significant turnover of MPs. The Baath Party increased the proportion of the seats (more than 67%) it has held in the Council since 1973. The slight rise in the number of Baath Party seats came at the expense of both the other authorised political parties (only six of the National Progressive Front parties and one party newly established after 2012 won seats in 2016) and independents (the number of which has never been so low since 1990). Although the distribution of seats by sectarian and ethnic group and gender is not a recognised form of representation in the People's Council, the implicit quotas for minorities which were applied in the pre-war decade were also much the same in 2016. However, the profiles of MPs show significant changes to the traditional categories which were usually represented in the People's Council before the war and included active members of the Baath Party or of its affiliated popular and union organisations, notables and tribal elders, businessmen, Sunni clerics and public figures. Except for traditional Baathists, who still were the most numerous in 2016, the characteristics of representatives of other interest groups (such as businessmen, Sunni clerics and tribal leaders, who are traditionally elected as 'independents') profoundly changed and new social categories (such as militia leaders and families of martyrs) emerged. The common characteristic of these newcomer MPs is that they had participated in war efforts alongside the regime. Shifts were more visible in governorates which had experienced major military, political and demographic upheavals (Aleppo, Daraa, Rural Damascus, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa) than in ones which had been spared from violence (Damascus, Latakia and Tartous) or retaken early by regime forces (Homs). The 2016-2020 Assembly looked like a 'council of war' and reflected three priorities of the regime in one of the most critical periods of the armed conflict. First, the regime needed to promote its most active supporters (involved in military or propaganda activities) all over the country at a time when its first objective was to win the military battle. Second, the large presence of traditional Baathists reveals a decision to restore the central role of the Baath Party in keeping alive state institutions after the internal crisis and shifts within the party in the first years of the uprising. Finally, the election of new actors (such as members of martyrs' families) illustrates the need for the regime to maintain its social base, particularly among minorities.